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Keeping "Reasonable Grounds" Meaningful
Steve Coughlan*
Two recent Court of Appeal cases (/?. v. Jir and R. v. Bush, both reported ante,
pp. 53 and 29) are examples of tendencies in some recent decisions to weaken
the "reasonable grounds" standard for arrest. That the reasonable grounds standard for arrest is important is beyond question. As the Supreme Court of Canada
has said,
Without such an important standard, even the most democratic society could
all too easily fall prey to the abuses and excesses of a police state.'

In subtle and sometimes unintentional ways, however, the reasonable ground
standard is being undermined. This short article will examine two ways in which
this can be seen: in the approach to what level of certainty the standard entails,
and in the approach to how the objective aspect of the standard can be proven.
Both Jir and Bush are relevant to each of these issues.
The Standard of Proof
The first issue to be discussed relates to how strict the reasonable grounds standard is: what level of certainty is required to meet the "reasonable grounds"
requirement with regard to arrest? In Jir, the court notes that the standard is less
than a prima facie case, which is a well-established point. The majority in Jir
also suggests, however, that "reasonable grounds" is less than the civil standard
of proof—put differently, that grounds could be reasonable without being
probable.
Section 495 of the Criminal Code at one point used the phrase "reasonable and
probable grounds" where it now only says "reasonable grounds". The former
phrase unquestionably required that the civil standard be met. In Baron, the Supreme Court of Canada discussed the relationship between the two phrases:
"Reasonable" is the same as "reasonable and probable" and imports the same
standard. "Reasonable" comprehends a requirement of probability. The use
of an interpretative "gloss" on the word to make it conform to constitutional
requirements is an unnecessary strain on the meaning of the word. The alleged distinction between the two phrases was a "refined distinction" of the
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type found in American constitutional jurisprudence and is to be avoided in
the interpretation of s. 8 of the Charter.-

This passage gives very strong reason to think that the British Columbia Court
of Appeal in Jir is wrong in saying that reasonable grounds are less than the
civil standard.
The authority sometimes cited for the view that grounds for arrest do not require
probability is Mugesera? quoted in Jir for the statement that
[t]he "reasonable grounds to believe" standard requires something more than
mere suspicion, but less than the standard applicable in civil matters of proof
on the balance of probabilities [citations omitted].4

The case of course does say that. The important point to note is that Mugesem is
NOT talking about the Criminal Code: it is talking about the distinct meaning of
"reasonable grounds to believe" that a person has committed a crime against
humanity in section 19 of the Immigration Act. That standard reflects the "serious reasons for considering that the claimant has committed crimes against humanity" standard in article F(a) of the United Nations Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees, and describes a standard which is consciously different
from that for arrest. The citation relied on in Mugesera was Sivakuinar, in which
the Federal Court, when speaking of this standard, explicitly said,
. . .the international community was willing to lower the usual standard of
proof'in order to ensure that war criminals were denied safe havens.-5

This error has been made more than once and really needs to be recognized and
avoided: Mugesera says nothing about the "reasonable grounds to believe" standard in the criminal context.6 If anything, the reference to lowering the usual
standard affirms that reasonable grounds in the criminal context do require
probability.
A further issue related to the "reasonable grounds for arrest" standard arises in
Bush. In that case, a motorist called police when he saw the accused driving
erratically. By the time a police officer arrived on the scene, the accused had
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crashed into a parked car. The officer spoke briefly with the accused and after a
very short time arrested him for driving while impaired. He had not seen the
accused driving nor asked him whether he had had anything to drink, though he
smelled alcohol and noticed that the accused had red eyes and was weaving back
and forth while standing. The officer acknowledged that the powder from the
vehicle's air bag could have caused the red eyes and that he could have been
shaken up by the accident. In essence, the evidence could be seen as close to the
line in terms of establishing reasonable grounds: the trial judge held that the
standard was met, while the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge held that
it was not.
A central issue in the case on appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal was whether
a lower "reasonable grounds" standard applies in the case of impaired driving
charges: the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge held that the trial judge
had wrongly concluded it did. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that there was
not a lower standard for impaired driving cases, but that on the ordinary standard
for warrantless arrests, reasonable grounds were made out. In part, they reach
this conclusion on the basis that it is easier to show reasonable grounds around
some things, such as impaired driving, than others. Two different strains are
identifiable in their reasoning, and it is worth being clear on the difference between the two of them.
It is important to distinguish clearly between the standard of proof and the difficulty of proof. We are all familiar with the differences between standards of
proof: reasonable belief is more than reasonable suspicion but less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, for example. Further, the "reasonable grounds" standard does not always describe exactly the same level of certainty: that is the
point above from Mugesera, that in the Immigration Act context a lower degree
of certainty than in the criminal law context can be described as "reasonable
grounds".7
Given this, certainly one way in which it might become easier to conclude that
the Crown has satisfied the burden on it would be by lowering the standard required. To rather arbitrarily attach percentages, if we said that reasonable
grounds was normally 65% certainty, it would be possible to make the task of
proof easier by lowering the standard of proof and saying "but in this context
only 50% certainty is needed".
However, that is not the only way for it to be simpler for the Crown to do its job
successfully. We can also look at the difficulty of proof: some things are simply
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304 [S.C.R.], holding that '"reasonable and probable grounds' can mean different things
in different contexts." The Court was there speaking of reasonable grounds in the search
context, not the arrest context, it is worth noting.

easier to prove than others. This is most easily seen by thinking about the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. Some inferences about state of
mind are so obvious it is difficult for a trier of fact not to draw them. Things
which can only be proven through circumstantial evidence are harder to prove
than matters where direct evidence is usable. Proving that a signed, handwritten
letter was prepared by the accused is easier than proving that an unsigned typewritten letter was prepared by the accused, and so on.8
The same point about different difficulties remains true even if the standard is
reasonable grounds rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt; as a practical
matter, it takes less evidence to have reasonable grounds to believe some things
than others.
In part, the Court of Appeal's reasoning here simply makes that point about
difficulty of proof. They note that in this case — as in impaired driving cases
generally — the only thing that needed to be proven in order to show that the
arrest was valid was that
. . .there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe the suspect's ability to drive was even slightly impaired by the consumption of alcohol.^

As they quite correctly observe, recognizing that some things are not very difficult to prove is not the same as applying a lower standard of proof. If that were
the only way the court reasoned here, there could be no cause for concern.
However, mixed in with these reasons are other passages which seem explicitly
to say that the standard of reasonable grounds itself is lower in the context of
warrantless arrests generally. That is more problematic, because it is inconsistent
with authority from the Supreme Court of Canada.
Specifically, in Bush the Ontario Court of Appeal repeats their own earlier conclusion in Golub^ that because a warrantless arrest is likely to happen in a volatile and changing situation with incomplete information, a lower standard applies than in situations where there is judicial scrutiny; in particular, the standard
is less demanding than would be required of a judge deciding whether reasonable grounds for a search warrant exist."
The difficulty here is not that the Court of Appeal suggests that "reasonable
grounds" might mean somewhat different things in the case of arrests with and
without a warrant. The difficulty is lhat they make the adjustment in the wrong
direction. The logic behind their conclusion seems to be that the police must be
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"cut some slack" in warrantless arrest situations: because things happen quickly
and there is less than complete information, the Ontario Court of Appeal seems
to be reasoning, courts should err on the side of favouring the police officer's
judgment.
The reason this is a difficulty is that the Supreme Court of Canada has considered this same issue, but reached exactly the opposite conclusion. In Storrey, the
Court held:
In order to safeguard the liberty of citizens, the Criminal Code requires the
police, when attempting to obtain a warrant for an arrest, to demonstrate to a
judicial officer that they have reasonable and probable grounds to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed the offence. In the case of an
arrest made without a warrant, it is even more important for the police to
demonstrate that they have those same reasonable and probable grounds
upon which they base the arrest.'^

In the view of the Supreme Court of Canada, therefore, when there is no prior
judicial scrutiny of police action we should err on the side of the liberty of citizens, not of the police. In those cases, the reasonable grounds standard goes up,
not down. This is as it should be. Where the scrutiny of police action happens
after the fact, not beforehand, the scrutiny should be stricter, not more relaxed:
police should not be able to opt for a lower reasonable grounds standard by
choosing not to seek a warrant.
Bush is therefore questionable on this aspect of its reasoning about reasonable
grounds in the breathalyser context: it intermingles issues of standard of proof
with difficulty of proof, and it is not consistent with Supreme Court authority.
The Objective Test
The second general issue regarding the current approach to reasonable grounds,
reflected in both Jir and Bush, relates to how the objective portion of that standard is to be characterized; in particular, what it means to speak, as the Supreme
Court did in Storrey, of "a reasonable person placed in the position of the officer".1-^ A trend in many recent cases has been to take that passage as meaning
that the reasonable person in the objective test is to be imbued with all the personal knowledge and experience that the arresting officer personally had.14 Such
an approach, however, undermines the very point of having an objective test at
all.
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This point too is discussed at greater length in Detention and Arrest, supra: see pp.
80-85.

In Jir, for example, there was room for some dispute about how suspicious the
accused's behaviour was. The police had received a tip that a vehicle would be
pulling into a church parking lot near the United States border at a particular
time. Pulling into a church parking lot at night is not, in the abstract, necessarily
suspicious; arriving late at night at a location used to smuggle drugs across the
border is, objectively, more suspicious. One would think, therefore, that whether
drugs had been smuggled into the United States by being thrown from locations
such as this would be relevant to whether the objective test was met.
The majority, however, say here that the evidence of such a method of smuggling drugs came from an officer other than the arresting one: Constable Fehr,
the arresting officer, never testified that he knew of such a method. Of course if
the arresting officer did not know this fact, then the existence of such a method
could not be taken into account in assessing whether that officer personally had
the subjective grounds to arrest. The majority, however, hold that because he
gave no such testimony,
. . .this is not something that should have been taken into account in determining whether Constable's Fehr's grounds were objectively reasonable.

This is an incongruous result. The point of looking to an objective test is to ask
about things which it is reasonable to believe, whether the particular officer
knows about them or not.
Jir runs against the norm, in the sense that evidence is being left out of the
"objective" analysis, therefore potentially benefiting the accused: more frequently the objective test is found to be made out based only on the officer's
testimony of his or her personal knowledge. Bush is an example of that approach. The decision is quite brief on the point, but it certainly seems to say that
the officer's unique knowledge is relevant not only to the subjective part of the
test, but to the objective test as well.
As noted above, the accused was arrested for driving while impaired. The officer
had relatively little information to rely on in making the arrest, but one fact
taken as relevant was that the officer knew of a civilian report of erratic driving
and knew that the civilian believed the driver was intoxicated. The Court of
Appeal notes that
[i]n his 18 years as a police officer. Constable Lucas found that type of information reliable.' 6

-'Jir, supra, para. 26 (emphasis added).
h, supra, para. 8.

Later, in assessing whether the grounds met the requisite standard for an arrest,
the Court of Appeal first notes the relevance of that experience to the subjective
test:
A trained police officer is entitled to draw inferences and make deductions
drawing on experience. Here, the investigating officer had 18 years' experience. . . .'^

They carry on, however, to say that that same personal experience could also
make the arrest objectively justified:
The trial judge was entitled to take into consideration that experience and
training in assessing whether he objectively had reasonable and probable
grounds . . ."*

The court went on to find that reasonable grounds did exist; the inclusion of the
officer's training worked to the disadvantage of the accused here, as it most
frequently does.
The important issue, of course, is not who happens to benefit in any given situation, it is whether the proper balance has been struck between individual liberty
and the protection of society. As noted above, the Supreme Court has said that
the purpose of the reasonable grounds standard is to protect society from the
excesses of a police state. It is, in other words, a standard which should be
treated seriously. And although grounds for arrest have both a subjective and an
objective component, the objective portion should be seen as the most important
aspect: they are, after all, meant to be reasonable grounds.
It is exceptional for an arrest to be found invalid because the subjective part of
the test was not met: in all but the most unusual cases police officers do not
arrest unless they personally think that they have grounds to do so. The reason
for the objective test is to test that subjective belief against an external standard.
The purpose of the objective test is therefore lost when that external standard is
defined by the testimony, training and experience of the very officer whose subjective belief is being questioned.
This result in Bush is particularly troubling when one combines it with the earlier point, the suggestion that the standard for reasonable grounds is lower in the
case of a warrantless arrest. Consider the dramatic difference that would begin
to exist between arrests with and without a warrant. In the former case, an arrest
could only occur if a neutral person, acting judicially, was personally convinced
that reasonable and probable grounds existed. In the latter case, on the Bush
approach, the reasonable grounds standard would initially be lower, and the subsequent judicial review would amount to little more than asking "if I were the
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officer, would I have thought I had reasonable grounds'?" That is not sensible
policy.
Conclusion
Police officers faced with compelling an accused's appearance in court initially
have four options to choose from: an appearance notice, a summons, an arrest
with a warrant, or an arrest without a warrant. In each of the first three cases, the
police officer's opinion that the accused ought to be required to appear in court
at all will be scrutinized by a judicial officer: the judicial officer who issues the
summons or warrant in those two cases or the judicial officer who cancels or
confirms the appearance notice in that case. Arrest without a warrant is unique
in that it is the only method of compelling appearance which is left entirely up to
the discretion of the police officer. A judicial officer will later decide whether an
accused arrested without a warrant should be released on bail pending appearance, for example, but the system contains no regular method for examining
whether the choice to compel appearance at all was a justifiable one. It is only in
cases where a Charter claim for arbitrary detention, a civil suit for false imprisonment, or some similar extraordinary action is taken that the police officer's
judgment will be questioned.
That unique status suggests that special care must be taken in considering arrests
without a warrant. At a minimum it requires that the standard of "reasonable
grounds" be treated seriously as the protection of individual liberty that it is
meant to be. More plausibly, it justifies holding warrantless arrests to a higher
standard than other methods of compelling appearance. It is the method of compelling appearance which is most intrusive on individual liberty, and to balance
that intrusiveness it ought to be subject to the strictest scrutiny.
Realistically such scrutiny only occurs when an accused challenges the grounds
for arrest at trial. To lower the standard of reasonable grounds itself, and to
weaken the objective aspect of that test, does not enhance the necessary scrutiny,
but instead diminishes it. Neither approach should be taken.

